Abstract. Lattices are regular arrangements of points in n-dimensional space, whose study appeared in the 19th century in both number theory and crystallography. Since the appearance of the celebrated LenstraLenstra-Lov asz lattice basis reduction algorithm twenty years ago, lattices have had surprising applications in cryptology. Until recently, the applications of lattices to cryptology were only negative, as lattices were used to break various cryptographic schemes. Paradoxically, several positive cryptographic applications of lattices have emerged in the past ve years: there now exist public-key cryptosystems based on the hardness of lattice problems, and lattices play a crucial rôle in a few security proofs. We survey the main examples of the two faces of lattices in cryptology.
Introduction
Lattices are discrete subgroups of R n . A lattice has in nitely many Z-bases, but some are more useful than others. The goal of lattice reduction is to nd interesting lattice bases, such as bases consisting of reasonably short and almost orthogonal vectors. From the mathematical point of view, the history of lattice reduction goes back to the reduction theory of quadratic forms developed by Lagrange 86] , Gauss 55] , Hermite 68] , Korkine and Zolotarev 82, 83] , among others, and to Minkowski's geometry of numbers 103] . With the advent of algorithmic number theory, the subject had a revival in 1981 with Lenstra's celebrated work on integer programming (see 89, 90] ), which was, among others, based on a novel lattice reduction technique (which can be found in the preliminary version 89] of 90]). Lenstra's reduction technique was only polynomial-time for xed dimension, which was however enough in 89]. That inspired Lov asz to develop a polynomial-time variant of the algorithm, which computes a so-called reduced basis of a lattice. The algorithm reached a nal form in the seminal paper 88] where Lenstra, Lenstra and Lov asz applied it to factor rational polynomials in polynomial time (back then, a famous problem), from which the name LLL comes. Further re nements of the LLL algorithm were later proposed, notably by Schnorr 121, 122] .
Those algorithms have proved invaluable in many areas of mathematics and computer science (see 91, 78, 132, 64, 36, 84] ). In particular, their relevance to cryptology was immediately understood, and they were used to break schemes based on the knapsack problem (see 119, 29] ), which were early alternatives to the RSA cryptosystem 120]. The success of reduction algorithms at breaking various cryptographic schemes over the past twenty years (see 75] ) have arguably established lattice reduction techniques as the most popular tool in public-key cryptanalysis. As a matter of fact, applications of lattices to cryptology have been mainly negative. Interestingly, it was noticed in many cryptanalytic experiments that LLL, as well as other lattice reduction algorithms, behave much more nicely than what was expected from the worst-case proved bounds. This led to a common belief among cryptographers, that lattice reduction is an easy problem, at least in practice.
That belief has recently been challenged by some exciting progress on the complexity of lattice problems, which originated in large part in two seminal papers written by Ajtai in 1996 and in 1997 respectively. Prior to 1996, little was known on the complexity of lattice problems. In his 1996 paper 3], Ajtai discovered a fascinating connection between the worst-case complexity and the average-case complexity of some well-known lattice problems. Such a connection is not known to hold for any other problem in NP believed to be outside P. In his 1997 paper 4], building on previous work by Adleman 2] , Ajtai further proved the NP-hardness (under randomized reductions) of the most famous lattice problem, the shortest vector problem (SVP). The NP-hardness of SVP has been a long standing open problem. Ajtai's breakthroughs initiated a series of new results on the complexity of lattice problems, which are nicely surveyed by Cai 30, 31] .
Those complexity results opened the door to positive applications in cryptology. Indeed, several cryptographic schemes based on the hardness of lattice problems were proposed shortly after Ajtai's discoveries (see 5, 61, 69, 32, 99, 50] ). Some have been broken, while others seem to resist state-of-the-art attacks, for now. Those schemes attracted interest for at least two reasons: on the one hand, there are very few public-key cryptosystems based on problems different from integer factorization or the discrete logarithm problem, and on the other hand, some of those schemes o ered encryption/decryption rates asymptotically higher than classical schemes. Besides, one of those schemes, by Ajtai and Dwork 5] , enjoyed a surprising security proof based on worst-case (instead of average-case) hardness assumptions.
Independently of those developments, there has been renewed cryptographic interest in lattice reduction, following a beautiful work by Coppersmith 38] in 1996. Coppersmith showed, by means of lattice reduction, how to solve rigorously certain problems, apparently non-linear, related to the question of nding small roots of low-degree polynomial equations. In particular, this has led to surprising attacks on the RSA 120] cryptosystem in special settings such as low public or private exponent, but curiously, also to new security proofs 128, 18 ]. Coppersmith's results di er from \traditional" applications of lattice reduction in cryptanalysis, where the underlying problem is already linear, and the attack often heuristic by requiring (at least) that current lattice reduction algorithms behave ideally, as opposed to what is theoretically guaranteed. The use of lattice reduction techniques to solve polynomial equations goes back to the eighties 66, 133] . The rst result of that kind, the broadcast attack on low-exponent RSA due to H astad 66] , can be viewed as a weaker version of Coppersmith's theorem on univariate modular polynomial equations.
A shorter version of this survey previously appeared in 118] . The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give basic de nitions and results on lattices and their algorithmic problems. In Section 3, we survey an old application of lattice reduction in cryptology: nding small solutions of multivariate linear equations, which includes the well-known subset sum or knapsack problem as a special case. In Section 4, we review a related problem: the hidden number problem. In Section 5, we discuss lattice-based cryptography, somehow a revival for knapsack-based cryptography. In Section 6, we discuss developments on the problem of nding small roots of polynomial equations, inspired by Coppersmith's discoveries in 1996. In Section 7, we survey the surprising links between lattice reduction, the RSA cryptosystem, and integer factorization.
2 Lattice problems
De nitions
Recall that a lattice is a discrete (additive) subgroup of R n . In particular, any subgroup of Z n is a lattice, and such lattices are called integer lattices. An equivalent de nition is that a lattice consists of all integral linear combinations of a set of linearly independent vectors, that is, There are in nitely many lattice bases when dim(L) 2. Any two bases are related to each other by some unimodular matrix (integral matrix of determinant 1), and therefore all the bases share the same Gramian determinant det 1 i;j d hb i ; b j i. The volume vol(L) (or determinant) of the lattice is by denition the square root of that Gramian determinant, thus corresponding to the d-dimensional volume of the parallelepiped spanned by the b i 's. In the important case of full-dimensional lattices where dim(L) = n, the volume is equal to the absolute value of the determinant of any lattice basis (hence the name determinant). If the lattice is further an integer lattice, then the volume is also
Since a lattice is discrete, it has a shortest non-zero vector: the Euclidean norm of such a vector is called the lattice rst minimum, denoted by 1 (L) or kLk. Of course, one can use other norms as well: we will use kLk 1 to denote the rst minimum for the in nity norm. More generally, for all 1 i dim(L), Minkowski's i-th minimum i (L) is de ned as the minimum of max 1 j i kv j k over all i linearly independent lattice vectors v 1 ; : : : ; v i 2 L. There always exist linearly independent lattice vectors v 1 ; : : : ; v d reaching the minima, that is kv i k = i (L). However, surprisingly, as soon as dim(L) 4, such vectors do not necessarily form a lattice basis, and when dim(L) 5, there may not even exist a lattice basis reaching the minima. This is one of the reasons why there exist several notions of basis reduction in high dimension, without any \optimal" one. It will be convenient to de ne the lattice gap as the ratio 2 (L)= 1 (L) between the rst two minima.
Minkowski A general principle, dating back to Gauss, estimates the number of lattice points (in a full-rank lattice) in nice sets of R n by the volume of the set divided by the volume of the lattice, with a small error term. This approach can be proved to be rigorous in certain settings, such as when the lattice dimension is xed and the set is the ball centered at the origin with radius growing to in nity. Thus, one often heuristically approximates the successive minima of a d-dimensional lattice L by
. This is of course only an intuitive estimate, which may be far away from the truth. 
Algorithmic problems
In the rest of this section, we assume implicitly that lattices are rational lattices (lattices in Q n ), and d will denote the lattice dimension.
The most famous lattice problem is the shortest vector problem (SVP): given a basis of a lattice L, nd u 2 L such that kuk = kLk (recall that kLk = 1 (L)). SVP 1 will denote the analogue for the in nity norm. One de nes approximate short vector problems by asking a non-zero v 2 L with norm bounded by some approximation factor: kvk f(d)kLk.
The closest vector problem (CVP), also called the nearest lattice point problem, is a non-homogeneous version of the shortest vector problem: given a basis of a lattice L and a vector v 2 R n (it does not matter whether or not v 2 span(L)), nd a lattice vector minimizing the distance to v. Again, one de nes approximate closest vector problems by asking u 2 L such that for all w 2 L, ku ? vk f(d)kw ? vk.
Another problem is the smallest basis problem (SBP), which has many variants depending on the exact meaning of \smallest". The variant currently in vogue (see 3, 14] ) is the following: nd a lattice basis minimizing the maximum of the lengths of its elements. A more geometric variant asks instead to minimize the product of the lengths (see 64]), since the product is always larger than the lattice volume, with equality if and only if the basis is orthogonal.
Complexity results
We refer to Cai 30, 31] for an up-to-date survey of complexity results. Ajtai 4] recently proved that SVP is NP-hard under randomized reductions. Micciancio 98, 97] 
Algorithmic results
The main algorithmic results are surveyed in 91, 78, 132, 64, 36, 84, 30, 109] . No polynomial-time algorithm is known for approximating either SVP, CVP or SBP to within a polynomial factor in the dimension d. In fact, the existence of such algorithms is an important open problem. The best polynomial time algorithms achieve only slightly subexponential factors, and are based on the LLL algorithm 88], which can approximate SVP and SBP. However, it should be emphasized that these algorithms typically perform much better than is theoretically guaranteed, on instances of practical interest. Given as input any basis of a lattice L, LLL provably outputs in polynomial time a basis (b 1 ; : : : ; b d ) satisfying:
Thus, LLL can approximate SVP to within 2 3 Finding small roots of multivariate linear equations One of the early and most natural applications of lattice reduction in cryptology was to nd small roots of multivariate linear equations, where the equations are either integer equations or modular equations.
Knapsacks
Cryptology and lattices share a long history with the knapsack (also called subset sum) problem, a well-known NP-hard problem considered by Karp, and a particular case of multivariate linear equation: given a set fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n g of positive integers and a sum s = P n i=1 x i a i , where x i 2 f0; 1g, recover the x i 's.
In 1978, Merkle and Hellman 96] invented one of the rst public-key cryptosystems, by converting some easy knapsacks into what they believed were hard knapsacks. It was basically the unique alternative to RSA until 1982, when Shamir 126] proposed a (heuristic) attack against the simplest version of the Merkle-Hellman scheme. Shamir used Lenstra's integer programming algorithm 89, 90] but, the same year, Adleman 1] showed how to use LLL instead, making experiments much easier. Brickell 27, 28] later extended the attacks to the more general \iterated" Merkle-Hellman scheme, and showed that MerkleHellman was insecure for all realistic parameters. The cryptanalysis of MerkleHellman schemes was the rst application of lattice reduction in cryptology.
Despite the failure of Merkle-Hellman cryptosystems, researchers continued to search for knapsack cryptosystems because such systems are very easy to implement and can attain very high encryption/decryption rates. But basically, all knapsack cryptosystems have been broken (for a survey, see 119]), either by speci c (often lattice-based) attacks or by the low-density attacks. The last signi cant candidate to survive was the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem 35], broken by Vaudenay 135] in 1997 with algebraic (not lattice) methods.
Low-density attacks on knapsacks
We only describe the basic link between lattices and knapsacks. Note that Ajtai's original proof 4] for the NP-hardness (under randomized reductions) of SVP used a connection between the subset sum problem and SVP.
Solving the knapsack problem amounts to nd a 0; 1-solution of an inhomogeneous linear equation, which can be viewed as a closest vector problem in a natural way, by considering the corresponding homogeneous linear equation, together with an arbitrary solution of the inhomogeneous equation. Indeed, let s = P n i=1 x i a i be a knapsack instance. One can compute in polynomial time integers y 1 ; : : : ; y n such that s = P n i=1 y i a i , using for instance an extended gcd algorithm. Then the vector (y 1 ? x 1 ; : : : ; y n ? x n ) belongs to the (n ? 1)-dimensional lattice L formed by all the solutions of the homogeneous equation, that is the vectors (z 1 ; : : : ; z n ) 2 Z n such that: z 1 a 1 + + z n a n = 0:
And this lattice vector is fairly close to the vector (y 1 ; : : : ; y n ), since the distance is roughly p n=2. But because x i 2 f0; 1g, the lattice vector is even closer to the vector y = (y 1 ? 1=2; : : : ; y n ? 1=2) for which the distance is exactly p n=4. In fact, it is easy to see that x = (y 1 ? x 1 ; : : : ; y n ? x n ) is a closest vector to y in the lattice L, and that any lattice vector whose distance to y is exactly p n=4 is necessarily of the form (y 1 ?x 0 1 ; : : : ; y n ?x 0 n ) where s = P n i=1 x 0 i a i and x 0 i 2 f0; 1g.
This gives a deterministic polynomial-time reduction from the knapsack problem to CVP (this reduction appeared in 100] with a slightly di erent lattice).
One can derive from this reduction a provable method to solve the knapsack problem in polynomial time with high probability when the knapsack density de ned as d = n= max 1 i n log 2 a i is low (see 85, 51, 54] ). Indeed, if kx ? yk = p n=4 is strictly less than 2 ?(n?1)=2?1 kLk, then by applying Babai's nearest plane CVP approximation algorithm to L and y, one obtains z 2 L such that kz?yk < 2 n=2 kx?yk < kLk=2, and thus kz?xk < kLk where z?x 2 L, which implies that z = x, disclosing the x i 's. It remains to estimate the rst minimum kLk. With high probability, the a i 's are coprime, and then:
Thus, one expects kLk 2 1=d p n 2 e . It follows that the method should work whenever r n 4 < 2 ?(n?1)=2?1 2 1=d r n 2 e ; that is, roughly d 2=n. This volume argument can be made rigorous because the probability that a xed non-zero vector belongs to L is less than 1=A when the a i 's are chosen uniformly at random from 0; A]. One deduces that most knapsacks of density roughly less than 2=n are solvable in polynomial time (see 85, 51, 54] ).
One does not know how to provably solve the knapsack problem in polynomial time when the density lies between 2=n and 1, which is typically the case for cryptographic knapsacks (where the density should be less than 1, otherwise heuristically, there would be several solutions, causing decryption troubles). However, one can hope that the embedding method that heuristically reduces CVP to SVP works, as while as the distance to the lattice (which is To summarize, the subset sum problem can always be e ciently reduced to CVP, and this reduction leads to an e cient probabilistic reduction to SVP in low density, and to a polynomial-time solution in extremely low density. In the light of recent results on the complexity of SVP, those reductions from knapsack to SVP may seem useless. Indeed, the NP-hardness of SVP under randomized reductions suggests that there is no polynomial-time algorithm that solves SVP. However, it turns out that in practice, one can hope that standard lattice reduction algorithms behave like SVP-oracles, up to reasonably high dimensions. Experiments carried out in 85, 124, 125] show the e ectiveness of such an approach for solving low-density subset sums, up to n about the range of 100{200.
It does not prove nor disprove that one can solve, in theory or in practice, lowdensity knapsacks with n over several hundreds. But it was su cient to show that knapsack cryptography was impractical: indeed, the keysize of knapsack schemes grows in general at least quadratically with n, so that high values of n (as required by lattice attacks) are not practical.
Thus, lattice methods to solve the subset sum problem are mainly heuristic. And lattice attacks against knapsack cryptosystems are somehow even more heuristic, because the reductions from knapsack to SVP assume a uniform distribution of the weights a i 's, which is in general not necessarily satis ed by knapsacks arising from cryptosystems. have dimension (n + 1). From the previous discussion, one can hope that the heuristic condition is satis ed when the density n= log(M) is very small (so that 1 (v ? ) is not too small), and m is su ciently large. And if the heuristic condition is satis ed, the lattice L x is disclosed, because it is then equal to the orthogonal lattice (u 1 ; : : : ; u m?(n+1) ) ? . Once L x is known, it is not di cult to recover (heuristically) the vectors x j 's by lattice reduction, because they are very short vectors. One eventually determines the coe cients j 's from a linear modular system. The method is quite heuristic, but it works in practice for small parameters in low density (see 117] for more details).
Multivariate modular linear equations
The technique described in Section 3.2 to solve the knapsack problem can easily be extended to nd small solutions of a system of multivariate linear equations over the integers: one views the problem as a closest vector problem in the lattice corresponding to the homogenized equations, which is an orthogonal lattice. Naturally, a similar method can be applied to a system of multivariate linear modular equations, except that in this case, the corresponding lattice is not an orthogonal lattice. Let A = (a i;j ) be an` k integral matrix, c 2 Z`be a column vector and q be a prime number. The problem is to nd a short column vector x 2 Z k such that:
Ax c (mod q):
The interesting case is when the number of unknowns k is larger than the number of equations`. Following Section 3, one computes an arbitrary solution y 2 Z k such that Ay c (mod q), for instance by nding a solution of a solvable system of linear equations over the integers (if the system is not solvable, then the original problem has no solution). And one computes a basis of the fulldimensional lattice L of all column vectors z 2 Z k such that Az 0 (mod q):
Then any short solution x to Ax c (mod q) corresponds to a lattice vector y?x 2 L close to y. Thus, there is at most one x 2 Z k such that Ax c (mod q) and kxk < kLk=2: And if ever there is an unusually short vector x 2 Z k such that Ax c (mod q) and kxk < kLk2 ?k=2?1 , then Babai's CVP approximation algorithm will disclose it, as in Section 3. It remains to lower bound the rst minimum of the lattice.
One can see that the volume of L is an integer dividing q`, because it is the index of L in Z k . In fact, for most matrices A, one expects the volume to be exactly q`, so that: kLk r k 2 e q`= k :
This estimate is not far from the truth, since for any xed non-zero vector z 2 Z k such that kxk 1 < q, the probability that z 2 L (when A is uniformly distributed) is exactly q ?`. It follows that for most matrices, if ever there exists x 2 Z k such that Ax c (mod q) and kxk roughly less than q`= k 2 ?k=2?1 , then one can nd such an x in polynomial time. For a precise statement, we refer to 52] who actually used a dual approach requiring transference theorems (which we do not need here). An interesting application is that if we know a few bits of each entry of an arbitrary solution x of a system of linear modular equations, then we can recover all of x, because if the number of bits is su ciently large, the problem is reduced to nding an unusually short solution of a system of linear modular equations. This was used to show the insecurity of truncated linear congruential pseudo-random number generators in 52].
The result can in fact be extended to a wider class of parameters, when the modulus q is not necessarily prime (see 52]), and when the equations may have di erent modulus (see 10]). We note that the exponent ?k=2 can be suppressed when a CVP-oracle is available, which is the case when k is xed. Furthermore, the previous reasoning not only shows how to nd unusually short solutions, it also shows how to nd reasonably short solutions when the matrix A is random. Indeed, a tighter analysis then shows that all the minima of the lattice L are in fact not too far away from p k=(2 e)q`= k , so that all points are reasonably close to the lattice. In this case, one can nd in polynomial time a vector x 2 Z k such that Ax c (mod q) and kxk is very roughly less than p k=(2 e)q`= k 2 k=2 .
This was used to attack certain RSA padding signature schemes in which the messages have a xed pattern (see 104, 57] ), and it was also used to complete the proof of security of the RSA{OAEP encryption scheme (see 53]). However, the previous results are weak in a certain sense. First, the results depend strongly on the distribution of the coe cients of the linear equations. More precisely, the rst minimum of the lattice can be arbitrary small, leading to possibly much weaker bounds: hence, one must perform a new analysis of the lattice for any system of equations which is not uniformly distributed. This was the case in 52] where linear congruential generators gave rise to special systems of equations. Furthermore, the exponential or slightly subexponential factors in the polynomial-time approximation of CVP imply that the bounds obtained are rather weak as the number k of unknowns increases. The situation is somewhat similar to that of knapsacks for which only knapsacks of very low density can provably be solved. This is one of the reasons why the attack of 104] was only heuristic. On the other hand, k was as small as 2 in 53], making provable results useful. We will see in the next section a particular case of a system of linear modular equations for which the generic method can be replaced by another lattice-based method. 4 The hidden number problem The proof goes as follows. We are given some g a and g b , and want to compute g ab . We repeatedly pick a random r until g a+r is a generator of Z q (testing is easy thanks to the factorization of q ? 1). For each r, the probability of success is (q ? 1)=(q ? 1) C= log log q. Next, we apply A to the points g a+r and g b+t for many random values of t, so that we learn the most signi cant bits of g and independently at random in Z q , and MSB`( t i mod q) for all i, recover 2 Z q . Here, MSB`(x) for x 2 Z q denotes any integer z satisfying jx ? zj < q=2`+ 1 . To achieve the proof, Boneh and Venkatesan presented a simple solution to HNP when`is not too small, by reducing HNP to a lattice closest vector problem. We sketch this solution in the next section.
Solving the hidden number problem by lattice reduction
Consider an HNP-instance: let t 1 ; : : : ; t d be chosen uniformly and independently at random in Z q , and a i = MSB`( t i mod q) where 2 Z q is hidden. Clearly, the vector t = (t 1 Thus, the hidden number problem can be solved using`= p log q+log log q bits.
Using the best polynomial-time CVP approximation algorithm known, this can be asymptotically improved to O( p log q log log log q= log log q). Theorem 2 is a simple consequence. We note that Theorem 4 could have alternatively be obtained from the generic method described in Section 3.4. Indeed, the hidden number problem that is` d=2 + 1 + log(q)=d, where the right-hand term is minimized for d p 2 log q, leading to`larger than roughly p 2 log q. Thus, one can obtain essentially the same bounds.
Variants of the hidden number problem
It was recently realized that the condition that the t i 's are uniformly distributed is often too restrictive for applications. The previous solution to the hidden number problem can in fact be extended to cases where the distribution of the t i 's is not necessarily perfectly uniform (see 63, 111] ). A precise de nition of this relaxed uniformity property can be made with the classical notion of discrepancy (see 111] for more details). To apply the solution to this generalized hidden number problem, it su ces to show that the distribution of the t i 's is su ciently uniform, which is usually obtained by exponential sum techniques (see 63, 111, 112, 48, 130, 129] for some examples).
One may also extend the solution to the hidden number problem to the case when an oracle for CVP (in the Euclidean norm or the in nity norm) is available, which signi cantly decreases the number of necessary bits (see 110, 111] ). This is useful to estimate what can be achieved in practice, especially when the lattice dimension is small. It turns out that the required number of bits becomes O(log log q) and 2 respectively, with a CVP-oracle and a CVP 1 -oracle.
One may also study the hidden number problem with arbitrary bits instead of most signi cant bits. It is easy to see that the HNP with`least signi cant bits can be reduced to the original HNP with`most signi cant bits, but the situation worsens with arbitrary bits. By multiplying the t i 's with an appropriate number independent of the t i 's (see 111]), one obtains a deterministic polynomial-time reduction from the HNP with`consecutive bits at a known position to the original HNP with`=2 most signi cant bits (the prime eld Z q and the number of random multipliers remain the same). This appropriate number can be found either by continued fractions or lattice reduction in dimension 2. More generally, by using high-dimensional lattice reduction, it is not di cult to show that there is a deterministic polynomial-time reduction from the HNP with`arbitrary bits at known positions such that the number of blocks of consecutive unknown bits is m, to the original HNP with`=m + 1 ? log m most signi cant bits. Thus, the HNP with arbitrary bits seems to be harder, especially when there are many blocks of consecutive unknown bits.
Finally, variants of the hidden number problem in settings other than prime elds have been studied in 130, 129, 23].
Lattice attacks on DSA
Interestingly, the previous solution of the hidden number problem also has a dark side: it leads to a simple attack against the Digital Signature Algorithm 106, 95] (DSA) in special settings (see 73, 110] ). Recall that the DSA uses a public element g 2 Z p of order q, a 160-bit prime dividing p ? 1 where p is a large prime (at least 512 bits). The signer has a secret key 2 Z q and a public key = g mod p. The Letting t i = r i 2 ?`s?1 i mod q, one sees that MSB`( t i mod q) is known. Recovering the secret key is therefore a generalized hidden number problem in which the t i 's are not assumed to be independent and uniformly distributed over Z q , but are of the form r i 2 ?`s?1 i where the underlying k i 's are independent and uniformly distributed over Z q . Nguyen and Shparlinski 111] proved that under a reasonable assumption on the hash function, the t i 's are su ciently uniform to make the corresponding hidden number problem provably tractable with the same number of bits as in Theorem 4, that is, essentially p log q. Since lattice reduction algorithms can behave much better than theoretically expected, one may even hope to solve CVP exactly, yielding better bounds to Theorem 4. For the case of a 160-bit prime q as in DSA, one obtains that the DSA{HNP can be solved using respectively`= 2 bits and d = 160, or`= 6 bits and d = 100 respectively, when an oracle for CVP 1 or CVP is available (see 110, 112] ). In fact, the bounds are better in practice. It turns out that using standard lattice reduction algorithms implemented in Shoup's NTL library 127], one can often solve HNP for a 160-bit prime q using`= 3 bits and d = 100 (see 110, 112] ). Naturally, this attack can also be applied to similar signature algorithms (see 111]), such as the elliptic curve variant of DSA (see 112]), or the NybergRueppel signature scheme and related schemes (see 48] ). The only di erence is that one needs to establish the uniformity of di erent types of multipliers. This usually requires di erent kinds of exponential sums.
Lattice-based cryptography
We review state-of-the-art results on the main lattice-based cryptosystems. To keep the presentation simple, descriptions of the schemes are intuitive, referring to the original papers for more details. Only one of these schemes (the GGH cryptosystem 61]) explicitly works with lattices.
The Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem
Description. The Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem 5] (AD) works in R n , with some nite precision depending on n. Its security is based on a variant of SVP.
The private key is a uniformly chosen vector u in the n-dimensional unit ball. One then de nes a distribution H u of points a in a large n-dimensional cube such that the dot product ha; ui is very close to Z. The public key is obtained by picking w 1 ; : : : ; w n , v 1 ; : : : ; v m (where m = n 3 )
independently at random from the distribution H u , subject to the constraint that the parallelepiped w spanned by the w i 's is not at. Thus, the public key consists of a polynomial number of points close to a collection of parallel a ne hyperplanes, which is kept secret. The scheme is mainly of theoretical purpose, as encryption is bit-by-bit. To encryption of '0' will always be decrypted as '0', and an encryption of '1' has a small probability to be decrypted as '0'. These decryption errors can be removed (see 60]).
Security. The Ajtai-Dwork 5] cryptosystem received wide attention due to a surprising security proof based on worst-case assumptions. Indeed, it was shown that any probabilistic algorithm distinguishing encryptions of a '0' from encryptions of a '1' with some polynomial advantage can be used to solve SVP in any n-dimensional lattice with gap 2 = 1 larger than n 8 . There is a converse, due to Nguyen and Stern 115]: one can decrypt in polynomial time with high probability, provided an oracle that approximates SVP to within n 0:5?" , or one that approximates CVP to within n 1:33 . It follows that the problem of decrypting ciphertexts is unlikely to be NP-hard, due to the result of GoldreichGoldwasser 58].
Nguyen and Stern 115] further presented a heuristic attack to recover the secret key. Experiments suggest that the attack is likely to succeed up to at least n = 32. For such parameters, the system is already impractical, as the public key requires 20 megabytes and the ciphertext for each bit has bit-length 6144. This shows that unless major improvements Experiments showed that the assumption was reasonable in practice.
The Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi cryptosystem
The Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi cryptosystem 61] (GGH) can be viewed as a lattice-analog to the McEliece 94] cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory. In both schemes, a ciphertext is the addition of a random noise vector to a vector corresponding to the plaintext. The public key and the private key are two representations of the same object (a lattice for GGH, a linear code for McEliece). The private key has a particular structure allowing to cancel noise vectors up to a certain bound. However, the domains in which all these operations take place are quite di erent.
Description. The GGH scheme works in Z n . The private key is a non-singular n n integral matrix R, with very short row vectors 4 (entries polynomial in n). The lattice L is the full-dimensional lattice in Z n spanned by the rows of R. The basis R is then transformed to a non-reduced basis B, which will be public. In the original scheme, B is the multiplication of R by su ciently many small unimodular matrices. Computing a basis as \good" as the private basis R, given only the non-reduced basis B, means approximating SBP.
The message space is a \large enough" cube in Z n . A message m 2 Z n is encrypted into c = mB + e where e is an error vector uniformly chosen from f? ; g n , where is a security parameter. A ciphertext c is decrypted as bcR ?1 eRB ?1 (note: this is Babai's round method 8] to solve CVP). But an eavesdropper is left with the CVP-instance de ned by c and B. The private basis R is generated in such a way that the decryption process succeeds with high probability. The larger is, the harder the CVP-instances are expected to be. But must be small for the decryption process to succeed.
Improvements. In the original scheme, the public matrix B is the multiplication of the secret matrix by su ciently many unimodular matrices. This means that without appropriate precaution, the public matrix may be as large as O(n 3 log n) bits. Micciancio 99, 101 ] therefore suggested to de ne instead B as the Hermite normal form (HNF) of R. Recall that the HNF of an integer square matrix R in row notation is the unique lower triangular matrix with coe cients in N such that: the rows span the same lattice as R, and any entry below the diagonal is strictly less than the diagonal entry in its column. Here, one can see that the HNF of R is O(n 2 log n) bits, which is much better but still big. When using the HNF, one should encode messages into the error vector e instead of a lattice point, because the HNF is unbalanced. The ciphertext is de ned as the reduction of e modulo the HNF, and hence uses less than O(n log n) bits. One can easily prove that the new scheme (which is now deterministic) cannot be less secure than the original GGH scheme (see 99, 101] ).
Security. GGH has no proven worst-case/average-case property, but it is much more e cient than AD. Speci cally, for security parameter n, key-size and encryption time can be O(n 2 log n) for GGH (note that McEliece is slightly better though), vs. at least O(n 4 ) for AD. For RSA and El-Gamal systems, key size is O(n) and computation time is O(n 3 ). The authors of GGH argued that the increase in size of the keys was more than compensated by the decrease in computation time. To bring con dence in their scheme, they published on the Internet a series of ve numerical challenges 59], in dimensions 200, 250, 300, 350 and 400. In each of these challenges, a public key and a ciphertext were given, and the challenge was to recover the plaintext.
The GGH scheme is now considered broken, at least in its original form, due to an attack recently developed by Nguyen 108] . As an application, using small computing power and Shoup's NTL library 127], Nguyen was able to solve all the GGH challenges, except the last one in dimension 400. But already in dimension 400, GGH is not very practical: in the 400-challenge, the public key takes 1.8 Mbytes without HNF or 124 Kbytes using the HNF. 5 Nguyen's attack used two \qualitatively di erent" weaknesses of GGH. The rst one is inherent to the GGH construction: the error vectors used in the encryption process are always much shorter 6 than lattice vectors. This makes CVP-instances arising from GGH easier than general CVP-instances. The second weakness is the particular form of the error vectors in the encryption process.
Recall that c = mB+e where e 2 f g n . The form of e was apparently chosen to maximize the Euclidean norm under requirements on the in nity norm. However, if we let s = ( ; : : : ; ) then c + s mB (mod 2 ), which allows to guess m mod 2 . Then the original closest vector problem can be reduced to nding a lattice vector within (smaller) distance e=(2 ) from (c ? (m mod 2 )B)=(2 ).
The simpli ed closest vector problem happens to be within reach (in practice) of current lattice reduction algorithms, thanks to the embedding strategy that heuristically reduces CVP to SVP. We refer to 108] for more information.
It is easy to x the second weakness by selecting the entries of the error vector e at random in f? ; : : : ; + g instead of f g. However, one can argue that the resulting GGH system would still not be much practical, even using 99, 101]. Indeed, Nguyen's experiments 108] showed that SVP could be solved in practice up to dimensions as high as 350, for (certain) lattices with gap as small as 10.
To be competitive, the new GGH system would require the hardness (in lower dimensions due to the size of the public key, even using 99]) of SVP for certain lattices of only slightly smaller gap, which means a rather smaller improvement in terms of reduction. Note also that those experiments do not support the practical hardness of Ajtai's variant of SVP in which the gap is polynomial in the lattice dimension. Besides, it is not clear how to make decryption e cient without a huge secret key (Babai's rounding requires the storage of R ?1 or a good approximation, which could be in 61] over 1 Mbytes in dimension 400). The challenges do not use the HNF, as they were proposed before 99]. Note that 124 Kbytes is about twice as large as McEliece for the recommended parameters. 6 In all GGH-like constructions known, the error vector is always at least twice as short.
The private keys are f 2 L(d f ; d f ? 1) and g 2 L (d g ; d g ). With high probability, f is invertible mod q. The public key h 2 R is de ned as h = g=f mod q: A message m 2 f?(p?1)=2 + (p ?1)=2g N is encrypted into: e = (p h+m) mod q; where is randomly chosen in L(d ; d ). The user can decrypt thanks to the congruence e f p g + m f (mod q), where the reduction is centered (one takes the smallest residue in absolute value). Since , f, g and m all have small coe cients and many zeroes (except possibly m), that congruence is likely to be a polynomial equality over Z. By further reducing e f modulo p, one thus recovers m f mod q, hence m.
Security. The best attack known against NTRU is based on lattice reduction, but this does not mean that lattice reduction is necessary to break NTRU. The simplest lattice-based attack can be described as follows. Coppersmith and (N log q) , which makes NTRU the leading candidate among knapsackbased and lattice-based cryptosystems, and allows high lattice dimensions. It seems that better attacks or better lattice reduction algorithms are required in order to break NTRU. To date, none of the numerical challenges proposed in 69] has been solved. However, it is probably too early to tell whether or not NTRU is secure. Note that NTRU, like RSA, should only be used with appropriate preprocessing. Indeed, NTRU without padding cannot be semantically secure since e(1) m(1) (mod q) as polynomials, and it is easily malleable using multiplications by X of polynomials (circular shifts). And there exist simple chosen ciphertext attacks 74] that can recover the secret key. 6 Finding small roots of low-degree polynomial equations
We survey an important application of lattice reduction found in 1996 by Coppersmith 38, 39], and its developments. These results illustrate the power of linearization combined with lattice reduction.
Univariate modular equations
The general problem of solving univariate polynomial equations modulo some integer N of unknown factorization seems to be hard. Indeed, notice that for some polynomials, it is equivalent to the knowledge of the factorization of N. And the particular case of extracting e-th roots modulo N is the problem of decrypting ciphertexts in the RSA cryptosystem, for an eavesdropper. Curiously, Coppersmith 38] showed using LLL that the special problem of nding small roots is easy: Theorem 5 (Coppersmith) . Let 
Multivariate modular equations
Interestingly, Theorem 5 can heuristically extend to multivariate polynomial modular equations. Assume for instance that one would like to nd all small roots of P(x; y) 0 (mod N), where P(x; y) has total degree and has at least one monic monomial x y ? of maximal total degree. If one could obtain two algebraically independent integral polynomial equations satis ed by all sufciently small modular roots (x; y), then one could compute (by resultant) a univariate integral polynomial equation satis ed by x, and hence nd e ciently all small (x; y). To monic monomials of total degree h. Due to the condition u 1 < or u 2 < ? , such polynomials are in bijective correspondence with the n monic monomials (associate to q u1;u2;v (x; y) the monomial x u1+v y u2+v( ? ) ). One can represent the polynomials as n-dimensional vectors in such a way that the n n matrix consisting of the q u1;u2;v (xX; yY )'s (for some ordering) is lower triangular with coe cients N ?v X u1+v y u2+v( ? ) on the diagonal. Now consider the rst two vectors r 1 (xX; yY ) and r 2 (xX; yY ) of an LLLreduced basis of the lattice spanned by the rows of that matrix. Since the rational q u1;u2;v (x 0 ; y 0 ) is actually an integer for any root (x 0 ; y 0 ) of P(x; y) modulo N, we need kr 1 (xX; yY )k and kr 2 (xX; yY )k to be less than 1= p n to apply Lemma 7. A (tedious) computation of the triangular matrix determinant enables to prove that r 1 (x; y) and r 2 (x; y) satisfy that bound when XY < N 1= ?" and h is su ciently large (see 76]). Thus, one obtains two integer polynomial bivariate equations satis ed by all small modular roots of P(x; y).
The problem is that, although such polynomial equations are linearly independent as vectors, they might be algebraically dependent, making the method heuristic. This heuristic assumption is unusual: many lattice-based attacks are heuristic in the sense that they require traditional lattice reduction algorithms to behave like SVP-oracles. An important open problem is to nd su cient conditions to make Coppersmith's method provable for bivariate (or multivariate) equations. Note that the method cannot work all the time. For instance, the polynomial x ? y has clearly too many roots over Z Remarks. In the case of univariate polynomials, there was basically no choice over the polynomials q u;v (x) = x u (P (x)=N) v used to generate the appropriate univariate integer polynomial equation satis ed by all small modular roots. There is much more freedom with bivariate modular equations. Indeed, in the description above, we selected the indices of the polynomials q u1;u2;v (x; y) in such a way that they corresponded to all the monomials of total degree h , which form a triangle in Z 2 when a monomial x i y j is represented by the point (i; j). This corresponds to the general case where a polynomial may have several monomials of maximal total degree. However, depending on the shape of the polynomial P(x; y) and the bounds X and Y , other regions of (u 1 ; u 2 ; v) might lead to better bounds.
Assume for instance P(x; y) is of the form x x y y plus a linear combination of x i y j 's where i x , j y and i + j < x + y . Intuitively, it is better to select the (u 1 ; u 2 ; v)'s to cover the rectangle of sides h x and h y instead of the previous triangle, by picking all q u1;u2;v (x; y) such that u 1 + v x h x and u 2 + v y h y , with u 1 < x or u 2 < y . One can show that the polynomials r 1 (x; y) and r 2 (x; y) obtained from the rst two vectors of an LLL-reduced basis of the appropriate lattice satisfy Lemma 7, provided that h is su ciently large, and the bounds satisfy X x Y y N 2=3?" . Boneh and Durfee 19] applied similar and other tricks to a polynomial of the form P(x; y) = xy + ax + b. This allowed better bounds than the generic bound, leading to improved attacks on RSA with low secret exponent (see also 46] for an extension to the trivariate case, useful when the RSA primes are unbalanced).
Multivariate integer equations
The general problem of solving multivariate polynomial equations over Z is also hard, as integer factorization is a special case. Coppersmith 38] showed that a similar 9 lattice-based approach can be used to nd small roots of bivariate polynomial equations over Z: Theorem 8 (Coppersmith) . Let P(x; y) be a polynomial in two variables over Z, of maximum degree in each variable separately, and assume the coe cients of f are relatively prime as a set. Let X; Y be bounds on the desired solutions x 0 ; y 0 . De neP (x; y) = P(Xx; Y y) and let D be the absolute value of the largest coe cient ofP . If XY < D 2= (3 ) , then in time polynomial in (log D; ), we can nd all integer pairs (x 0 ; y 0 ) such that P(x 0 ; y 0 ) = 0, jx 0 j < X and jy 0 j < Y .
Again, the method extends heuristically to more than two variables, and there can be improved bounds depending on the shape 10 of the polynomial (see 38]). Theorem 8 was introduced to factor in polynomial time an RSA{modulus 11 9 However current proofs are somehow more technical than for Theorem 5. A simplication analogue to what has been obtained for Theorem 5 would be useful. 10 The coe cient 2/3 is natural from the remarks at the end of the previous section for the bivariate modular case. If we had assumed P to have total degree , the bound would be XY < D 1 . 11 p and q are assumed to have similar size. N = pq provided that half of the (either least or most signi cant) bits of either p or q are known (see 38, 17, 20] , by applying Coppersmith's technique to bivariate modular polynomials and improving the generic bound. Note that the attack is heuristic (see Section 6), but experiments showed that it works well in practice (no counterexample has ever been found). This bound holds when the RSA primes are balanced: Durfee and Nguyen 46] improved the bound when the primes are unbalanced, using an extension to trivariate modular polynomials. All those attacks on RSA with small private exponent also hold against the RSA signature scheme, since they only use the public key. A related result (using Coppersmith's technique for either bivariate integer or univariate modular polynomials) is an attack 20] to recover d when a large portion of the bits of d is known (see 16]).
Lattice attacks on RSA signature
The RSA cryptosystem is often used as a digital signature scheme. To prevent various attacks, one must apply a preprocessing scheme to the message, prior to signature. The recommended solution is to use hash functions and appropriate padding (see current standards and 95]). However, several alternative simple solutions not involving hashing have been proposed, and sometimes accepted as standards. Today, all such solutions have been broken (see 57]), some of them by lattice reduction techniques (see 104, 57] ). Those lattice attacks are heuristic but work well in practice. They apply lattice reduction algorithms to nd small solutions to modular linear systems, which leads to signature forgeries for certain proposed RSA signature schemes. Finding such small solutions is viewed as a closest vector problem for some norm, as seen in Section 3.4.
Security of RSA{OAEP
Although no e cient method is known to invert the RSA encryption function in general, it is widely accepted that the RSA encryption scheme should not be directly used as such, because it does not satisfy strong security notions (see for instance 22, 95] for a simple explanation): a preprocessing function should be applied to the message prior to encryption. The most famous preprocessing scheme for RSA is OAEP proposed by Bellare and Rogaway 11], which is standardized in PKCS. The RSA{OAEP scheme was only recently proved to be strongly secure (semantic security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks), under the assumption that the RSA function is hard to invert and the random oracle model. This was rst proved by Shoup 128] for the particular case of public exponent 3 using Coppersmith's theorem on univariate polynomial equations, and later extended to any exponent by Fujisaki et al. 53] . Interestingly, the last part of the proof of 53] relied on lattices (in dimension 2) to nd a small solution to a linear modular equation (see Section 3.4). Note however that the result could also have been obtained with continued fractions. Boneh 18] recently proposed a simpler version of OAEP for the RSA and Rabin encryption functions. The proof for Rabin is based on Coppersmith's lattice-based theorem on univariate polynomial equations, while the proof for RSA uses lattices again to nd small solutions of linear modular equations. It is somewhat surprising that lattices are used both to attack RSA in certain settings, and to prove the security of industrial uses of RSA.
Factoring and lattice reduction
In the general case, the best attack against RSA encryption or signature is integer factorization. Note that to prove (or disprove) the equivalence between integer factorization and breaking RSA encryption remains an important open problem in cryptology (latest results 25] suggest that breaking RSA encryption may actually be easier). We already pointed out that in some special cases, lattice reduction leads to e cient factorization: when the factors are partially known 38], or when the number to factor has the form p r q with large r 21]. Schnorr 123] was the rst to establish a link between integer factorization and lattice reduction, which was later extended by Adleman 2] . Schnorr 123] proposed a heuristic method to factor general numbers, using lattice reduction to approximate the closest vector problem in the in nity or the L 1 norm. Adleman 2] showed how to use the Euclidean norm instead, which is more suited to current lattice reduction algorithms. Those methods use the same underlying ideas as sieving algorithms (see 36]): to factor a number n, they try to nd many congruences of smooth numbers to produce random square congruences of the form x 2 y 2 (mod n), after a linear algebra step. Heuristic assumptions are needed to ensure the existence of appropriate congruences. The problem of nding such congruences is seen as a closest vector problem. Still, it should be noted that those methods are theoretical, since they are not adapted to currently known lattice reduction algorithms. To be useful, they would require very good lattice reduction for lattices of dimension over at least several thousands.
We close this review by mentioning that current versions of the Number Field Sieve (NFS) (see 87, 36] ), the best algorithm known for factoring large integers, use lattice reduction. Indeed, LLL plays a crucial role in the last stage of NFS where one has to compute an algebraic square root of a huge algebraic number given as a product of hundreds of thousands of small ones. The best algorithm known to solve this problem is due to Montgomery (see 105, 107] ). It has been used in all recent large factorizations, notably the record factorization 34] of a 512-bit RSA-number of 155 decimal digits proposed in the RSA challenges. There, LLL is applied many times in low dimension (less than 10) to nd nice algebraic integers in integral ideals. But the overall running time of NFS is dominated by other stages, such as sieving and linear algebra.
Conclusions
The LLL algorithm and other lattice basis reduction algorithms have proved invaluable in cryptology. They have become the most popular tool in public-key cryptanalysis. In particular, they play a crucial rôle in several attacks against the RSA cryptosystem. The past few years have seen new, sometimes provable, lattice-based methods for solving problems which were a priori not linear, and this de nitely opens new elds of applications. Interestingly, several provable lattice-based results introduced in cryptanalysis have also recently been used in the area of security proofs. Paradoxically, at the same time, a series of complexity results on lattice reduction has emerged, giving rise to another family of cryptographic schemes based on the hardness of lattice problems. The resulting cryptosystems have enjoyed di erent fates, but it is probably too early to tell whether or not secure and practical cryptography can be built using hardness of lattice problems. Indeed, several questions on lattices remain open. In particular, we still do not know whether or not it is easy to approximate the shortest vector problem up to some polynomial factor, or to nd the shortest vector when the lattice gap is larger than some polynomial in the dimension. Besides, only very few lattice basis reduction algorithms are known, and their behaviour (both complexity and output quality) is still not well understood. And so far, there has not been any massive computer experiment in lattice reduction comparable to what has been done for integer factorization or the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Twenty years of lattice reduction yielded surprising applications in cryptology. We hope the next twenty years will prove as exciting.
